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THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DERIVATIVE
ACTION: A VIEW FROM THE OTHER SIDE
DOUGLAS M. BRANSON*
Market model advocates see no significant role for corporate liability
rules and the derivative suit, which historically has been a principal means
of enforcing rules applicable to corporate managers. Market forces, arising
in the market for the corporation's products, in the market for managers,
and in the market for corporate control, should be the principal, if not the
only, regulator of corporations and their managers. Hence, the American
Law Institute (ALI) project, and in particular its part on remedies, become
superfluous.'
The remaining commentators, on the other hand, are closely aligned
with the ALI project. Some are consultants to the reportorial staff. 2 Another
has co-authored an article on derivative actions with the ALI reporter for
Part VII, Remedies. These commentators are leading supporters of the ALI
point of view.
The commentary on a topic should, however, if possible proffer a well-
rounded discussion of that topic. What the commentary on derivative actions
lacks is not necessarily someone responding to market model advocates but
rather someone tugging at the ALI Proposals from the other side, acting as
a counterweight to the Chicago school, economic analysis point of view.
* Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound. B.A. 1965, University of Notre Dame;
J.D. 1970, Northwestern University; LL.M. 1974, University of Virginia. The author gratefully
acknowledges contributions by Professors James D. Cox, John C. Coffee, and Daniel C. Smith
who read and commented on an earlier version of this article. The author, of course, remains
wholly responsible for the contents, including any errors or omissions, either of fact or judgment,
which remain herein.
1. See, e.g., Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U. L. REV. 913, 944 (1982) ("The
function of corporation law ... is rather limited. Apart from minimizing transaction costs and
possibly facilitating the operation of market forces that discipline management, corporation law
has little role to play."); Comment, Shareholders' Derivation Suits and Shareholders' Welfare:
An Evaluation and a Proposal, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 856, 902-05 (1983) (proposal to abolish the
derivative suit).
2. See AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Pt. VII, Remedies, Ch. 1, The Derivative Action, at V. (Discussion
Draft No. 1, June 3, 1985) [hereinafter cited as ALI Proposals]. This article will refer to the
ALI derivative action material as ALI Discussion Draft or ALI Proposals. The ALI project as
a whole will be referred to as the ALI Project, the Project, or PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE.
3. Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal
for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981).
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What the commentary lacks is a view from the left as, quite ironically, any
pro-shareholder point of view has come to be regarded.
4
On the right and in the middle, discussion focuses upon the plaintiff's
attorney, as the engine who drives the derivative action. He or she has been
disparaged as a "bounty hunter" and an "unfaithful champion." 5 The
commentators speak of the " 'phantom' plaintiffs' attorney whose only
specialty is the politics of class action" or derivative suit organization.
6
Moreover, commentators' and reporters' attention has been riveted upon
the tricks and wiles of the Wilmington, Philadelphia, and New York plain-
tiffs' bars. A large share of the litigation takes place in those precincts and
plaintiffs in that litigation inevitably have only the most nominal interests,
such as ownership of five or ten shares in the corporation. The true party in
interest is the attorney and the focus upon him is justified.
7
But all corporate litigation does not involve a Harry Lewis8 and originate
in the Wilmington-Philadelphia axis. What of the plaintiff shareholder whose
stake, while not alone large enough to justify the costs of litigation, is much
greater than nominal? And what of the attorney who represents this genuinely
aggrieved shareholder but whose practice does not consist solely, or even
primarily, of derivative litigation? What of the attorney who represents a
truly aggrieved shareholder in Portland, Oregon, Portland, Maine, or another
regional financial center? 9 Any balanced presentation must attempt a sighting
4. In any group other than corporate lawyers, such as academics, the shareholder
proponent is considered to be to the right, rather than the left.
5. See Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as
Bounty Hunter is Not Working, 42 MD. L. RaV. 215 (1983). See also Findlater, The Proposed
Revision of DR 5-103(B): Champerty and Class Actions, 36 Bus. LAW. 1667, 1674 (1981)
(accusations of champerty and maintenance); Duesenberg, The Business Judgment Rule and
Shareholder Derivative Suits: A View From the Inside, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 311, 333 (1982)
("Filing lawsuits with little or no merit has become ... a way of life with many lawyers.. .
6. Coffee, supra note 5, at 278.
7. See ALI Proposals supra note 2, at 5-6.
8. Harry Lewis is one of several archetypal professional plaintiffs. By his own admission,
he has been a "named plaintiff in several hundred ... class and derivative actions." Affidavit
of Harry Lewis, dated Sept. 24, 1984, at 2, in Lewis v. Berry, No. C 82-1244 VR, W.D. Wash.
'at Seattle. One search reveals that he has been the named plaintiff in at least 52 recent reported
federal corporation-securities law judicial opinions. See infra note 108.
9. The ALI project's primary thrust is "Large Publicly Held Corporations," those with
2,000 or more record owners of securities and $100 million total assets, and "Publicly Held
Corporations," those with 500 or more holders and $3 million total assets. PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUCTURE §§ 1.15 & 1.21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1982). But the
remedies section's intended application is not so limited. See Discussion Draft No. 1 § 7.01(a)
(material applicable to closely held corporations). Moreover, in the limited judicial reference
thus far, courts have not noted any limitation to large companies. See, e.g., Miller v. Register
and Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 717 (Iowa 1983); Klinicki v. Lundgren, 298 Or.
662,-_, 695 P.2d 906, 917-18 (1985). Thus, the ALl Project will affect corporations in
Florida or Oklahoma, in Maine or in Oregon, as well as Fortune 500 companies, a fact largely
forgotten in the discussion of bounty hunters, Delaware cases, and the largest of New York
Stock Exchange listed companies. The former category of corporations, with shareholders
numbering from 10 to 499, number in the tens of thousands and are sometimes referred to as
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through those less jaundiced eyes.' 0
In Part I this article considers the obstacles that such an attorney would
find in derivative litigation, that are not present in other forms of litigation.
Part II then considers recent developments that have made the derivative
action process even more of a gauntlet which plaintiffs must run. These
developments include recent, and largely unnoted, substantive law changes
which have dramatically lessened a shareholder's legal protections," as well
as recent, more publicized procedural developments which permit a corpo-
ration more easily to sidetrack or derail derivative actions. Part III first
reviews, and then proposes a restructuring of, Principles of Corporate
Governance, Part VII, Chapter 1. Such a restructuring would attempt to
insure that the genuinely aggrieved shareholder will have at least an even
chance of litigating his or her claim against corporate officers and directors,
and at the same time to reduce significantly the amount of abuse presently
surrounding the derivative action. Short of a restructuring, Part IV considers
discrete changes to the ALI Proposals that would at least go some way
toward giving the Maine or Oregon plaintiff a fighting chance in derivative
litigation.
Finally, Part V points toward reasons for supposing that genuinely
aggrieved shareholders might exist in numbers sufficient to justify change in
the ALI Proposals. The genuinely aggrieved shareholder's presence in re-
ported cases is not proportionate to his true number because at the local and
regional levels a lack of incentive and even a chilling effect exists for
plaintiffs' counsel in derivative litigation. On those levels the factual setting
surrounding derivative litigation might be almost opposite that which the
ALI and its reporters have presumed to exist, based upon experiences at the
national level and with Fortune 500 companies.
I. A LAWYER'S FIRST LOOK AT A DERIVATIVE ACTION
A. Traditional Obstacles and Preliminary Concerns
A business litigator who had not reviewed material on derivative actions
since perhaps law school would discover that, compared to what he would
face in other forms of litigation, the derivative action resembles a minefield.
"quasi public" corporations. ,See Conard, The Corporate Census: A Preliminary Exploration,
63 CALIF. L. REv. 440, 458-59 (1975); infra note 155.
10. A complete presentation of points of view regarding derivative actions would include
a fourth commentary, by members of the corporate plaintiffs' bar, whose practices have been
so severely criticized. Surprisingly, no member of that bar has published views on the ALI
Project. Perhaps, in the language of economic analysis, the plaintiffs' bar has been taking a
free ride on the efforts of liberal law professors and others on the "left." But see Morris, A
View of Representative Actions, Derivative and Class, From a Plaintiff's Attorney's Vantage
Point, 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 273 (1978).
I1. See generally Branson, Countertrends In Corporation Law: Model Business Corpo-
ration Act Revision, British Company Law Reform, and Principles of Corporate Governance
and Structure, 68 MINN. L. REv. 53, 56-72 (1983).
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There are many traps for the unwary and procedural pitfalls that could cause
the litigator to lose the war.' 2 More important to the lawyer personally would
be his reflection that on numerous occasions, through loss of a motion or
failure to comply with a procedural requirement, the lawyer could suffer a
diminution in reputation or the loss of a client's other business. More
seriously, all his time on the case would be wasted. Most seriously, the
lawyer might visualize allegations of malpractice. These reflections must have
a chilling effect on the lawyer's enthusiasm for the underlying claim.' 3 They
might lead the lawyer to counsel a course of conduct other than "tricky"
derivative litigation.
The first hurdle in derivative litigation is easy enough. Contemporaneous
ownership requirements state that the plaintiff must have been "a shareholder
or member at the time of the transaction of which he complains .... ,,4
This is a simple yes or no determination. An injustice may be caused to the
would-be plaintiff who purchased after the wrong occurred but before its
existence became known or knowable. Courts sometimes aid such a plaintiff
by finding that the transaction has resulted in a continuing wrong.,5
Next the plaintiff must make a demand on the corporation's board of
directors to obtain the action he desires.16 He must then wait, perhaps for
quite a long time,17 while the board conducts its own investigation, or merely
does nothing. If the board investigates, the business judgment rule can
12. Traps for the unwary attorney in the field of derivative actions have been reviewed
elsewhere but largely in the abstract and not from the perspective of a general business litigator
about to take the plaintiff's side. See, e.g., Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in
Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J. 959,
965-970. See also W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORAnONS 885-1001
(1980).
13. And are to be contrasted with "the classic profile of the strike suit: a slapdash action,
inadequately researched as to either the facts or the law, brought by an attorney who is currently
the attorney of record in a large number of similar pending actions." Coffee, The Unfaithful
Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(1985) (forthcoming).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See also ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 13-A, § 627(l)(A) (1964)
(contemporaneous holder must have been record, as opposed to beneficial, holder). Cf. ALI
Proposals § 7.02 & comment C at 35 (beneficial owners can sue). As a non-commercial state,
Oregon does not have codification of procedural rules for derivative actions in either its court
rules or code of civil procedure and no citation to Oregon statutes is therefore possible. Letter
from Barnes Ellis, Esq., Stoel, Rives law firm, Portland, Oregon, to Professor Douglas Branson
(August 28, 1985) (on file with Washington & Lee Law Review). Mr. Ellis is a business litigator
and was counsel for plaintiffs in Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 564 P.2d 277
(1977), and for defendants in Gleason v. International Multifoods Corp., 282 Or. 253, 577 P.2d
931 (1978), both derivative actions.
15. See, e.g., Palmer v. Morris, 316 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1963); Maclary v. Pleasant Hills,
Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 109 A.2d 830 (1954); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 13, at 915.
ALI Proposals § 7.02(a)(1) permits a shareholder to sue if the holder "acquired his equity
security before the earlier of the time when the material facts relating to the alleged wrong were
publicly disclosed or were known by the holder."
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 13-A, § 627(I)(B) (1964).
17. See, e.g., Allison on Behalf of General Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 604
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come into play. The board will refuse the demand to take action and if the
board, or a subgroup thereof, has been reasonably diligent and unburdened
by disabling conflicts of interest, a court will not second guess or review the
directors' decision. The plaintiff's claim will die.' 8
Alternatively, a wise board of directors might choose to take action. The
action taken could be little more than a slap on the wrist for the corporate
officer or director whom plaintiff has suspected of wrongdoing. Again,
director action probably would cause plaintiff's claim to die.' 9
Plaintiff, however, has a third choice. He can and probably will allege
that demand would be futile because the wrongdoing implicates a majority
of the directors,20 or because a party implicated in the wrongdoing dominates
the directors. 2' Plaintiff must allege "with particularity ... the reasons for
his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. . ." to obtain
action from the board.22 This requirement can be a problem because without
a complaint on file a plaintiff cannot undertake discovery that would enable
him to flesh out his suspicions of a coverup or of other wider involvement
in the wrongdoing, or of the alleged wrongdoers' domination of the board.
In addition, under this alternative, demand excused, plaintiff may also
meet the business judgment rule. Demand will be excused as futile only if
plaintiff can allege, with particularity, why a reasonable doubt exists as to
the directors' entitlement to the business judgment rule and its protections
had they investigated the plaintiff's claim.? The test seems fair enough, in
part because plaintiff need only demonstrate reasonable doubt. Proof raising
a fair inference that the directors, or a majority of them, were dominated
or had a disabling conflict of interest, would seem to suffice. But in a recent
F. Supp. 1106, 1118-19 (D. Del. 1985) (2 1/2 months delay and "brush off" response from
defense counsel did not enable plaintiff to file).
18. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 12, at 961, n.7 ("Only in rare cases will courts allow the
plaintiff to proceed after a rejected demand."). See also Abramowitz v. Posner, 672 F.2d 1025,
1033 (2d Cir. 1982); infra note 61 (Delaware courts have no power to review merits of decision
holding that board of directors refused plaintiff's demand).
19. See, e.g., Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965).
See also Scott, Corporation Law and The American Law Institute Corporate Governance
Project, 35 STAN. L. REv. 927, 944 (1983) ("the most probable reason for the board to want
to take over a suit [against some of its members] would be to undermine it").
20. Plaintiff cannot, however, merely name the directors as defendants without grounds
therefor, or allege that the directors were merely passive in the face of wrongdoing by others.
See, e.g., In re Kauffman Mutual Fund Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 264 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 857 (1973). Stronger allegations are usually necessary. See, e.g., Barr v. Wackman, 36
N.Y.2d 371, 377, 329 N.E.2d 180, 185, 368 N.Y.S.2d 497, 504 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Clark v. Lomas & Nettleton Financial Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 52-54 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. See also ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit. 13-A, § 627(1)(B) (1964)
(plaintiff also "alleges that at least 10 days before instituting the action he either informed the
corporation of such board of directors in writing of the ultimate facts of each cause of action
against each defendant or delivered ... a true copy of the complaint which he proposes to
file . ... ).
23. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
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case, the Delaware courts have held that receipt of lucrative consulting
contracts by an elderly director and ownership by him of 47 percent of the
company's shares did not raise even the spectre of board domination that
would have made demand on the board futile. 24 Thus, while the facts seemed
to speak for themselves, and in publicly held companies even the most
unschooled of courts could take notice that 47 percent constitutes nearly
unassailable control, the Delaware courts blushingly acted the part of naive
handmaidens to corporate defendants. 25
If plaintiff's Portland lawyer understands demand made, demand re-
fused, and demand excused, he must then verify his complaint which, as
noted, must allege certain facts with particularity. 26 The attorney must make
the verification without the benefit of discovery. In modern court practice,
pleadings in general need not be verified. 27 Because verification is not routine,
a good lawyer would take such a requirement seriously.28 Counterallegations
that a lawyer or his client had verified allegations without a basis therefore
are serious charges and no lawyer would want to leave himself open to that
possibility. 29
Also, the lawyer with the Oregon or Maine client must discuss the
possibility of being required to put up security for expenses.3 0 In their
discretion, many courts can require a derivative action plaintiff to post a
bond, with a commercial surety thereon, or collateralized in some other
fashion. The bond must stand to cover defendants' costs and attorneys' fees
should plaintiff lose and be found 'not to have brought the action based
24. See, e.g., id. at 808-09.
25. The phenomenon of announcing a sound principle but, in order to comply with it,
putting a high evidentiary burden on plaintiffs, or a very low burden on defendant directors,
has antecedents in Delaware. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 551 (Del. 1964).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ME. R. CIv. PRO. 23(b) (1985).
27. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
28. Verification requirements add little in view of the 1983 amendments to rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. An attorney's signature now "constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading ... that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing
law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass ...... Id.
Moreover, "[i]f a pleading ... is signed in violation of [the] rule, the court ... shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction. . .
ALI Proposals § 7.04 deletes any verification requirement.
29. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1966) (report of
proceeding in trial court and on appeal).
30. See MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 49 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MBCA]. Maine
deleted its security for expenses statute in 1973. See Historical Note to ME. REv. STAT. ANN.,
tit. 13-A, § 627 (1981). Delaware has never had such a provision. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Flying
Tiger Line, Inc., 451 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1971). In fact, with its statutes deeming the situs
of Delaware corporations' shares to be Delaware and providing for sequestration of such shares,
and its later constructive consent statute, Delaware has a policy of encouraging derivative action
plaintiffs to file, if not succeed, in its courts. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977)
(discussing these Delaware statutes); Jacobs & Stargatt, The New Delaware Director-Consent-
to-Service Statute, 33 Bus. LAw. 701 (1978) (discussing constructive consent statute).
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upon reasonable cause a.3 The potential of first having to give security and
then the prospect of forfeiting it must exert a chilling effect on counsel and
client.
Another pitfall is that civil practice acts may require a derivative action
plaintiff to make a demand on the corporation's shareholders, as well as on
the corporation's directors.3 2 Courts frequently dispense with this requirement
because of the delay and expense involved. 33 Nonetheless, defendants can
attempt to exploit the requirement, at least to the extent of filing a motion
which plaintiff's counsel must oppose through brief and argument.
34
B. Judicial Control Over Plaintiff's Counsel
Peering into the distance, plaintiff's attorney can see that once beyond
barriers defense lawyers raise, the attorney still may not have clear sailing.
The court will have control over any settlement of the action, as well as over
the attorney's fee.35 Moreover, the fee will be based upon an hourly rate,
oddly enough with a contingency bonus in the instance of a long shot or
specially problematic case.36 The attorney might prefer to gamble on the
larger payoff of a percentage of recovery method of compensation, which
might be well earned based upon the uphill nature of derivative litigation,
and which is common in other forms of contingent fee litigation. In a
derivative action he will not be able to do soY
31. Some statutes that require derivative action plaintiffs to post a bond do not apply if
plaintiff owns 5% of the corporation's stock or shares having a value exceeding $25,000. See,
e.g., MBCA § 49. Judges often delay ordering security so plaintiffs may seek co-plaintiffs
owning the requisite amount. To avoid the publicity that process could generate, one defense
strategem recommends not invoking the statute. See Cox, supra note 12, at 965. But if the
lawyer and plaintiff do not know of that judicial practice, or defense reaction to it, on the
surface at least security for expense statutes will have a chilling effect. Of course, the genuinely
aggrieved plaintiff, whose stake, while not alone large enough to justify the costs of litigation,
is much greater than nominal, by definition may have an investment approaching or exceeding
$25,000.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1. Maine specifically negates shareholder demand requests. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., titl. 13-A, § 627 (1973).
33. See, e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 931-35. But see Bell v. Arnold"
175 Colo. 277, 487 P.2d 545 (1971) (demand on 26,000 shareholders required).
34. Where civil practice acts require the derivative action plaintiff to make a demand on
the corporation's shareholders, such requirements may be strictly construed. See, e.g., Mokhiber
v. Cohn, 608 F. Supp. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, No. 85-7537 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 1986) (available
on LExis).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1; ME. R. CiV. PRO. 23A.
36. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 261-62 & 286-87. Cf. Leubsdorf, The Contingency
Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90 YALE L.J. 473 (1981).
37. The ALl does not opt for either fee formula, being content with the admonition that,
however computed, the fee not exceed a "reasonable percentage of the total recovery." ALI
Proposals § 7.17, comment (a) at 224. By contrast, in duty of loyalty cases one commentator
has suggested that for effective enforcement perhaps "the recovery in its entirety should go to
the attorney." Scott, supra note 19, at 941, n.43.
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Then, too, for a second, or even a third,38 time the lawyer will have to
face the business judgment rule. On the merits of any duty of care claim the
likely defense will be the business judgment rule. "Absent bad faith or some
other corrupt motive, directors are normally not liable to the corporation
for mistakes of judgment .... -39 At any trial, or even prior to trial in a
motion for summary judgment, 4° defense counsel will contend that a mistake
in judgment, not a lack of reasonable care, caused any harm the corporation
has suffered. Moreover, courts become muddled, applying the business
judgment rule in duty of loyalty cases as well, at least when defendant
directors have had no direct pecuniary interest in the transaction. 4' The
business judgment rule thus may seem to sit as an almost insurmountable
obstacle just before the end of the derivative action rainbow.
The pot of gold which sits at the end of the gauntlet or rainbow,
depending upon one's point of view, is the common provision for attorney's
fees from the corporate treasury. 42 What motivates plaintiff's lawyer to
undertake the arduous route is the prospect of attorney's fees if he is
successful. Even short of success on the merits, the lawyer will be entitled
to attorney's fees if a settlement of the action confers a substantial benefit
upon the corporation. 43 In many cases the prospect of fees earned through
a settlement results in plaintiff's lawyer never running the gauntlet previously
outlined. If plaintiff's attorney survives the first obstacle or two, the parties
reach a cosmetic settlement which has as a principal ingredient provision of
generous attorney's fees. 44 The fictional personality and really nominal
presence of the corporation enable the lawyers to reach such a settlement.
38. See, e.g., supra notes 16-25 and accompanying text (business judgment rule and
demand refused or demand excused as futile); infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (motion
to terminate based upon special litigation committee report).
39. Cramer v. General Tel. & Electronics Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). See also PRINCIPLES OF CORu'ORATE GOVERNANCE § 4.01(c) (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1985) (general statement of rule).
40. See, e.g., Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, -, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (Del. 1960), on
remand sub. nom. Elster v. American Airlines, Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 476, 167 A.2d 231 (Del. 1961).
41. Commentators trace application of the business judgment rule in duty of loyalty cases
to Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). See Gilson, A Structural Approach
to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REv. 819,
827-28 (1981); Comment, The Misapplication of the Business Judgment Rule in Contests for
Corporate Control, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 980, 1001 (1982). The defense of control cases remain
good illustrations of the phenomenon. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271,
297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292
(3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Morrissey v. County Tower Corp., 559 F.
Supp. 1115, 1123 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd per curiam, 717 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1983). See also Unocal.
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 1985 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,077 (Del. 1985); MORAN V.
HOUSEHOLD INT'L, INC., 490 A.2d 1059 (Del. 1985), discussed infra note 78.
42. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970) (private attorney
general theory); Reiser v. Del Monte Properties, Co., 605 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1979)
(later application of Mills); ALI Proposals at 227-28, 240-41 (substantial benefit theory).
44. The classic description of the process of settling derivative actions is by the late Judge
Friendly, dissenting in Allegheny Corp. v. Kirby 333 F.2d 327, 347 (2d Cir. 1964).
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In essence fees are taxed to an absent third party with a generous ability to
pay and no strong voice of its own with which to object.
Our plaintiff's lawyer in Oregon or Maine, however, at the outset does
not know that such is the way the game is played in Delaware or in New
York. The procedural gauntlet will deter him from commencing the litigation.
Moreover, if the uninitiated lawyer does learn the ropes of cosmetic settle-
ments, his scruples or his client, who is after all aggrieved and has staked at
least some costs and possibly fees, may prevent him from participating in
any sham or extortionate settlement.4 5 Some, perhaps many, lawyers will act
at least in small part out of principle. If the Oregon or Maine lawyer does
later accept or fall into the cosmetic settlement trap, it may be that once
upon the road of the derivative action, the constantly uphill procedural
gauntlet and the relentless incantation of "business judgment" edge the
lawyer over into doing so.
Apart from cosmetic settlements, state Blue Sky laws may enable plain-
tiffs to obtain attorney's fees from the corporate "defendant" without having
to undertake the long and arduous path of the derivative suit. State Blue
Sky laws routinely award attorney's fees to successful plaintiffs.4 6 Therefore,
the addition of, or primary reliance upon, a state securities antifraud rule
violation seems quite common. 47 Derivative action procedural complexity
may serve only to shift litigation into other areas in which the prevailing
party can obtain fees from defendants and the procedural hurdles are fewer
in number.
C. A Different Analytical Viewpoint
Mr. Justice Holmes bade judges, scholars and others to approach the
45. The prevalent assumption is flatly that the attorney is "the engine that runs the
derivative action," ALI Proposals at 6, and that in turn the prospect of fees from the corporate
treasury drives the attorney. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 316. Those
assumptions may represent overaggregation. Loyalty to the aggrieved shareholder client, a desire
to retain his other legal business, a desire to do a workmanlike job, a desire to see similar
wrongdoing by others deterred, or a desire to see wrongdoers "punished" may also motivate
an attorney, especially one whose steady diet is not derivative litigation. Although punishment
has never been recognized as a goal of derivative litigation, it may not motivate a plaintiff's
attorney who, while not a crusader, believes that the wrongdoer should be "nailed" for his
actions. See Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb. 644, 673, 93 N.W. 1024, 1035 (1903)
(Pound, J.); cf. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative
Suit Procedures, 52 GEO. WAsH. L. REV. 745, 763 (1985).
46. See UNIF. SEc. L. § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. at 670 (1958); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 32,
§ 10605 (Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.125(2) & 59.127(2) (1985).
47. Obtaining attorney's fees without pursuing a derivative action may be easier to do
under state than under federal securities laws, as state law may grant wider standing. Compare
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 59.115(l)(b) & 59.127(l)(b) (1985) (standing for offerees, as well as purchasers
and sellers of securities) with SEC Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951) (prohibiting acts
performed only "in connection with the purchase or sale" of securities) and Blue Chip Stamps
v. NIanor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (affirming narrow purchaser-seller standing require-
ment). The state of mind required to be proven may also be less under state statutes than under
the federal rule. Compare Kittilson v. Ford, 93 Wash.2d 223, 608 P.2d 264 (1980) with Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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law as would a "bad man, who cares only for the material consequences
... knowledge enables him to predict. .... -48 To a great extent, in analyzing
the probable conduct of the bounty hunter in derivative litigation, commen-
tators have only followed Justice Holmes's admonition. 49 Nevertheless, it is
helpful to stand Justice Holmes's proposition on its head, approaching the
law as would a "good [man], who finds his reasons for conduct," or some
of them at least, "in the vaguer sanctions of conscience."5 0 To do so certainly
gives one a different view of derivative actions and of the chilling effect




A. The Special Litigation Committee
The most publicized recent developments in derivative actions came in
1979. In Burks v. Lasker5 the Supreme Court drew attention to boards of
directors' possible state law powers to dismiss derivative actions. Apparently
relying on a few older state decisions,5 2 the Court found that the Investment
Company Act of 1940 contained no federal law obstacle to dismissal.,3 Less
than two months later a state court added flesh to the state law component
of the idea.
In Auerbach v. Bennett,5 4 the New York Court of Appeals held that
"[t]he substantive aspects of a decision to terminate a shareholder's derivative
action ... are beyond judicial inquiry" if the decision has been made by an
independent committee of the board, based upon a reasonably diligent
investigation.55 The business judgment rule would shield the litigation com-
mittee's decision. Several federal courts of appeal jumped quickly on the
bandwagon, making Erie guesses as to what state law might provide in states
with no precedent or other authority on the matter.
5 6
48. 0. W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 171 (1920).
49. See, e.g., Branson, supra note 11, at 62-63 (applying Holmes' bad man theory to
recent revision of substantive corporation law).
50. 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 48, at 171.
51. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
52. While the Burks majority opinion cited none of the older state decisions holding that
corporate directors have discretion in making corporate decisions, in his concurring opinion
Mr. Justice Stewart did cite three such decisions. See 441 U.S. at 487, citing, McKee v. Rogers,
18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A. 191 (1931) and Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Savings & Trust Co., 130 N.E.2d
442 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1954) and Goodwin v. Castleton, 19 Wash. 2d 748, 144 P.2d 725
(1944). See also Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 273 (discussing older state decisions).
53. 441 U.S. at 480.
54. 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 414 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
55. 47 N.Y.2d at 623, 393 N.E.2d at 996, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
56. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979) (Delaware law),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979) (California
law), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980). Cf. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982)
(Connecticut law), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
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Burks, Auerbach, and their progeny struck the derivative action like a
lightning bolt. Commentators were quick to decry those cases as the death
of the derivative action.57 Defense lawyers were quick to hone and utilize the
committee device. 8 They did so with great success. Litigation committees
found very few, if any, derivative actions to be in the corporation's best
interests. 9 New directors were added to boards so that independent minions
existed, paper trails were laid so that good faith and diligence in investigations
could be documented, and motions to terminate were made and granted, so
that corporations could get on with their businesses.
When finally faced with the issue, courts in states other than New York
were more reluctant. The Delaware Supreme Court held that a trial court
could in its discretion review the merits of the litigation committee's decision,
as well as the committee's good faith and diligence. 60 Courts in other states
narrowed further the use of the litigation committee device. 6'
The advent of the litigation committee should not have surprised the
commentators and plaintiffs' bar as much as it did. The device had no less
than three antecedents, 62 although neither the Supreme Court nor the New
57. See, e.g., Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. Rav. 96 (1980); Note, Special Litigation Commit-
tees-An Expanding and Potent Threat to Shareholder Derivative Suits, 2 CARDozo L. REV.
169 (1980).
58. See, e.g.,Payson, Goldman & Inskip, After Maldonado: The Role of the Special
Litigation Committee in the Investigation and Dismissal of Derivative Suits, 37 Bus. LAW. 1199
(1982); Veasey, Seeking a Safe Harbor from Judicial Scrutiny of Directors' Business Decisions-
An Analytical Framework of Litigation Strategy and Counselling Directors, 37 Bus. LAw 1247
(1982).
59. "[N]ot one committee, in all these instances, has decided to proceed with suit."
Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886 (1985). Cf. ALI Proposals at 124 (in
two cases committee recommended action go forward but only against "some, but not all ....
defendant former employees").
60. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). But, illogically it seems, a
Delaware court has no power to review the decision on the merits when demand has been made
and refused. See, e.g., Allison on behalf of General Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
604 F. Supp. 1106, 1121 (D. Del. 1985).
61. See, e.g., Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndication, 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa 1983)
(board of directors is without power to delegate to litigation committee when a majority of
directors are defendants); Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 324 S.E.2d 878 (1985) (same).
62. The first antecedent to corporations' use of litigation committee was the increased
emphasis upon boards of independent directors and use of committees of those directors in
many phases of corporate life. The audit committee and the compensation committee, as
components of the so-called monitoring model, were well known and much discussed in 1979
and before. See, e.g., M.A. EISENBERG, THE STRucTuRE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL
ANALYSIS 170-77 & 206-11 (1976); Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the
Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 375, 404-09, 436-
38 (1975).
Second, courts had recognized boards of directors' power independently to settle, if not
dismiss, the corporation's claims against directors and officers. Wolf v. Barkes, 348 F.2d 994
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 941 (1965). If properly done, the result was the same. Board
action would oust the derivative action plaintiff.
Third, in the early 1970s counsel increasingly had used litigation committees to respond
to or to head off SEC investigations, principally into illegal political and foreign payments.
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York Court of Appeals discussed any of them. Moreover, the litigation
committee or similar device has a place. Just as a natural person should be
able to decide whether or not to pursue a good, or a not so good, cause of
action, a corporation should be able to decide not to pursue a lawsuit.63
Since a corporation has no readily identifiable soul or body, unlike a natural
person, the principal question is which of the corporation's various organs
should have the principal voice or final say on the decision to sue or not to
sue.
Most of the better reasoned criticism has focused on how corporations
have implemented the special litigation device. For example, when a board
committee must decide whether the corporation should pursue a cause of
action against directors or senior management, the problem of so-called
structural bias is ubiquitous. Subliminally, at least, directors will favor
individuals with whom they have worked or whom they have known for
years. 4 New directors, added to the board to staff and make more inde-
pendent the committee, might also tend to favor the defendants' side. After
the committee completes its work those new directors have implicitly been
guaranteed continuation as board members. That is an inducement to reach
the "right" outcome. In addition, candidates for the new directorships and
the litigation committee will remove themselves from candidacy if they sense
that they might have to go against the grain, reach an outcome different
from what they sense the "right" outcome to be, or be involved in a possible
corporate "mess." In the remaining pool of candidates for special litigation
directorships, a strong structural bias must exist. A principal question facing
the commentators and the ALI is how to correct for or minimize this
structural bias.
Thus it is misleading, and even incorrect, to state, as market model
advocates have done, that recent proposals have "focused on the need to
strengthen the derivative suit." ' 65 Rather, efforts such as the ALI Proposals
Although the device differed from the derivative action litigation committee in that the SEC
closely monitored and reviewed the merits, a properly conducted committee investigation could
forestall formal SEC action. See Matthews, Internal Corporate Investigations, 45 Oio ST. L.J.
655 (1984).
63. See Solomont & Sons Trust, Inc. v. New England Theatres Operating Corp., 326
Mass. 99, 111-12, 93 N.E.2d 241, 247-48 (shareholders vote may be able to preclude a suit even
when there exists no shareholder power to ratify). "The question whether it is good judgment
to sue is quite apart from the question of ratification .... It is not always best to insist upon
all one's rights .... I d.
64. See, e.g., Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and
Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985). See also
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd in part, 671 F.2d 729 (2d
Cir. 1982) (court considered and rejected argument based on structural bias as "cynical"); Joy
v. North, 519 F. Supp. 1312, 1321-22 (D. Conn. 1981), rev'd 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (struc-
tural bias arguments "place in jeopardy the concept of a litigation committee at a time when
such committees have become widely accepted, useful tools for disposing of detrimental derivative
actions").
65. See, e.g., Comment, supra note I, at 858-59.
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merely have sought to maintain the status quo in the face of market model
advocates and large corporation apologists who would all but eliminate the
derivative action. Other efforts have been to recover some of the vast amount
of ground lost very suddenly in 1979-80, or to correct for the problem of
structural bias, or to balance the litigation committee tool so that it accom-
modates legitimate shareholder, management and corporate interests.
B. The Interaction of Substantive Corporation Law and Derivative Action
Developments
Proposals with regard to the derivative action must also be viewed
against the backdrop of corporation law developments other than the liti-
gation committee device's rapid development over the last several years.
Fifteen years ago shareholders in American corporations had a multi-layered,
complex set of protections. Federal securities law was often used directly or
indirectly to protect shareholders, as well as investors. 66 State corporation
law contained a number of discrete commands for corporate managements.
Such commands included, for example, prohibitions on stock issuances for
promissory notes or future services, or in violation of shareholder preemptive
rights; prohibitions on loans to officers and directors without shareholder
approval; and prohibition of the taking of certain actions unless approved
at a shareholders' meeting in which a quorum of a majority had been
represented, and in which approval had been by a majority or even two-
thirds of the shares entitled to vote.67 State law also had a system of checks
and balances in a structural, or governance, system that allowed shareholders
to protect themselves, principally through election and removal of directors. 6
Finally, as a backup, state law had general principles, namely the fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty and the duty of majority to minority shareholders,
to protect shareholders when the governance structure or the discrete com-
mands of statutes and cases had failed. 69 Beyond federal and state law,
markets for corporate control and for managers operated to protect share-
holders, although their operation was only first theorized or understood
fifteen years ago.
70
Since that time many of these shareholder protections have been swept
away. In an impressive string of decisions for defendants, over a short span
66. See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 264, 289-300.
67. See Branson, supra note 11, at 58-62 (treatment of hypothetical transaction under
MBCA's of 1965 and 1983).
68. State laws providing for election and removal of directors arguably are ineffective at
protecting shareholders, because it was long ago recognized that large publicly held corporations'
shareholdings were atomized and unable to recombine, resulting in an ability for management
to utilize the governance system to perpetuate itself. A. BER.LE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 47-116 (rev. ed. 1967).
69. See Branson, supra note 11, at 59-61.
70. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fni. EcON. 305 (1970); Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. EcON. 110 (1965).
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of years, the Burger court removed shareholder protection from the arena
of federal law.7 Subsequently, corporation law revision has taken a pro-
nounced turn toward the elimination of substantive commands for corporate
managements. Prohibitions on loans to officers and directors, restrictions on
share issuances generally, and many other substantive do's and don'ts are
being swept away. 72 Simultaneously, many of the traditional underpinnings
of the governance system are disappearing, such as presumptive cumulative
voting, which allows minority shareholders to have representation on the
board of directors, and preemptive rights, which aid shareholders in main-
taining their proportionate ownership and voting interests." Requirements
for shareholder votes on certain issues, majority quorum requirements for
valid action at meetings, high voting requirements at meetings once a quorum
is present, and more, will soon be gone as well.7 4
A principal justification for all of the relaxation and change in the
corporation law area has been the existence of fiduciary duty.7" Policymakers
expect that general fiduciary principles will fill the void created by the
elimination of other protections. Yet even as a backup, fiduciary duty has
not worked well. At best it produces inconsistent results. 76 With the vast
expansion of the business judgment rule in recent years,7 7 fiduciary duty and
its requirements have become even more amorphous, if not attenuated.
Corporation law's entire mass rests upon a bed of mushy general principle.
78
Finally, fiduciary duty and reliance upon it as the basis for elimination
71. See, e.g., Conard, Securities Regulation in the Burger Court, 56 COLO. L. REV. 193
(1985); Hazen, Symposium Introduction-The Supreme Court and the Securities Laws: Has the
Pendulum Slowed? 30 EMORY L.J. 5 (1981). A centerpiece of the string of Supreme Court
decisions rendering federal law unavailable for shareholder protection was Sante Fe Indus. Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), holding that plaintiffs may not address state corporation law
claims under the guise of federal securities laws.
72. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 8.32(a)(2) (loans to directors), 6.21(b)
(broadened eligible consideration for shares), 6.02 (increased director authority for blank check
preferred stock), 6.24 (broad director authority to issue share rights, options or warrants) (1984)
[hereinafter cited as REv. MODEL ACT].
73. See, e.g., REV. MODEL ACT §§ 7.28(b) (presumptive cumulative voting eliminated),
6.30(a) (presumptive preemptive rights eliminated).
74. See, e.g., REV. MODEL ACT §§ 11.03(g) (shareholder vote eliminated for "small scale"
mergers), 7.25(a) & Comment 5 (no floor or provision for low quorums), 10.03(e)(2) & 7.25
(articles can be amended by plurality of those present and voting rather than a majority of two
thirds of all shares entitled to vote).
75. See Branson, supra note 11, at 70-72.
76. See, e.g., Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 381 (2d Cir. 1980) (share
issuance to dilute tender offeror's position upheld); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43
Del. Ch. 353, 364, 230 A.2d 769, 776 (1967) (share issuance to defeat tender offer struck down).
77. See supra note 41.
78. See Moran V. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (del. 1985) ("poison pill" tender
offer defense analyzed in terms of fiduciary duty and business judgment rule); Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (selective share repurchase by tender offer
target analyzed in terms of business judgment rule or principle of equal treatment for shareholders).
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of other, traditional shareholder protections becomes an empty promise when
shareholders find that through rigid demand requirements and the litigation
committee device, boards of directors and not laws or judges will determine
the degree to which fiduciary duty actually will protect shares. The result is
that those corporation law protections which remain have boiled down to
nothing more than a shareholder right to petition directors, hat in hand, for
a redress of grievances.
True, market forces protect shareholders. Yet it requires a great leap of
faith into the icy waters of market forces to abandon so many legal
protections in such a short span of time. Furthermore, although redundant
systems such as the old, multi-layered system of shareholder protections
impose costs, all redundancy need not be eliminated. A complex web of
federal and state law rules may dampen significantly corporate managers'
willingness to enter transactions or take risks. On the other hand, some
consistent legal protections, even if redundant when placed next to market
forces, impose few costs or impose costs that are outweighed by benefits.
79
An opportunity to have a fair day in court may encourage investment as
much or more than the assurance that, on average, or if the investor's
portfolio is diversified, the market will protect him, as the Chicago school
law and economics movement smugly asserts.
C. The Plaintiff's Viewpoint.
Less globally, what is the effect of these recent developments on the
genuinely aggrieved shareholder and his lawyer in Portland, Oregon or in
Portland, Maine?
First, upon groping about, the Portland lawyer may find that he has far
fewer substantive rules to apply, argue for, or otherwise use.80 Statutory do's
and don'ts are a convenient short hand for the plaintiff seeking to constrain
management. They also carry weight with a court, giving the court a
convenient peg on which to hang its hat. The lawyer, however, will have to
fall back on general principle and fiduciary duty, where bright lines fade
and issues of fact abound.8 1
Second, in addition to all the traditional obstacles in the way of derivative
litigation, the provincial litigator will read up a bit about the advent and
implementation of the litigation committee device. The certain use of the
committee will exert further chilling effect on any enthusiasm the lawyer had
79. Accord, Cox, supra note 45, at 748.
80. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text. This dearth of substantive rules assumes
that the state follows the letter or trend of the Revised Model Act.
81. Good faith is an issue likely to be ubiquitous. The accompanying issue of fairness,
another question of fact, will also remain. Resolution for plaintiff in advance of trial, as on
motion for summary judgment, will not be possible, as it might have been in the days of more
substantive rule. See, e.g., Cermetek, Inc. v. Butler Avpak, Inc., 573 F.2d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir.
1979) (issues of fact which remain must be resolved against party moving for summary
judgment); U.S. v. Western Electric Co., 337 F.2d 568, 572 (9th Cir. 1964) (same).
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for the litigation. A possibility does exist, though, that the lawyer can
persuade the trial court first to review and then to disagree with the litigation
committee's recommendation of dismissal. Although such a victory is a
tenuous reed upon which to rely, the possibility may rekindle the lawyer's
enthusiasm. Equally likely, though, since neither Maine nor Oregon has
precedent for court review of litigation committee decisions, 2 the lawyer
may foresee the local court's adoption of the Auerbach approach which
creates a wide ambit for the business judgment rule.83 Under the Auerbach
approach, no review of the merits of the committee's decision would occur
if the committee and its counsel have been careful in their preparations and
deliberation. The chilling effect of that prospect may be complete. Even the
truly aggrieved shareholder's complaint will be frozen in its tracks.
III. TnE ALI PROPOSALS: A RESTRUCTURING.
A. Elimination of Technical Barriers and Implementation of a Balanced
Approach.
The ALI Proposals eliminate many of those overly broad, technical
obstacles which have had a chilling effect on plaintiffs and have inhibited
all derivative litigation, regardless of the claims' merits. 84 The draft eliminates
any requirement that a derivative plaintiff be a record holder of shares, as
opposed to a beneficial owner and in particular an owner who has his stock
held in street names.85 Provisions requiring security for expenses and verifi-
cation of pleadings serve to single out the derivative action unnecessarily. As
a result the ALI draft deletes them. 86 Any language that could be used by a
court or by a defendant to urge that demand be made on the shareholders
has been eliminated.
87
82. State courts have addressed the issue of review of the litigation committee's decision
in only five states-Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, New York, and North Carolina. ALI Proposals,
supra note 2, at 97. In addition, in Oregon, all other procedural attributes of the derivative
action remain uncodified. See supra note 14.
83. Even under the Delaware two-stage approach, which gives the court power to review
the merits even after finding good faith and diligence on the committee's part, no review of the
merits will take place in a demand made and refused rather than demand excused-special
litigation committee case. See supra note 60.
84. Seldom has an ALl reporter immersed himself so thoroughly and learnedly in a topic
as had the reporter for Part VII. Moreover, the reporter's attempt to take a balanced view is
evident on the face of the document itself, despite pulls and tugs in many directions, some of
which he has described. See Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 789 (1984). Deserving as he is of high
praise, however, the reporter would be the last to suggest that the ALI Proposals should not
be examined from every possible viewpoint.
85. See ALI Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.02. Cf. id. at 44 (8 states now require plaintiffs
to be record holders).
86. See ALl Proposals, supra note 2, §§ 7.04(a) (verification), 7.04(c) (security for
expenses). Cf. REv. MODEL ACT, supra note 72, § 7.40 (1984) (verification and other require-
ments retained).
87. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.03(c). The draft also grafts on to the contempora-
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The ALI Proposals retain the special litigation committee device but
take an "intermediate position."1 8 In its discretion a court has power to
review the merits of the committee's recommendation. 9 A litigation com-
mittee's findings must be "particularized and corroborated, "90 to the end
that committees will be dissuaded from relying on makeweight effects, such
as injury to management morale or harm to corporate good will. If the
corporation takes over and pursues the action, the displaced plaintiff's
attorney should be "entitled to remain in the litigation in the same status as
intervenor and may be entitled to an award of attorneys' fees.... ."91 If the
corporation proposes to settle a claim against a wrongdoing director or
officer, objecting shareholders are given liberal opportunity to appear and
present evidence in opposition to the settlement. 92
B. Further Evaluation of the ALI
Proposals: Some Reservations
1. Inadequate Treatment of Structural Bias
The draft leaves itself open to three criticisms. First, the draft does not
adequately deal with the structural bias problem. Indeed, it barely treats the
problem at all. 93 Even when seemingly independent of the wrongs and persons
complained of, litigation committee members will have an innate inclination
to favor the derivative action defendants. The probable reasons are many:
pat-on-the-backism, the "there but for the Grace of God go I" syndrome,
the choice not to participate by those prospective committee and board
members who would conduct a searching inquiry, and new directors' expec-
tations that if the committee completes its work "properly" they will be held
over as permanent additions to the board. 94 The strong and easily understood
possibility of structural bias will lead to a lessening of public and investor
confidence in the results special litigation committees reach. A corresponding
loss of confidence in our corporate governance system ensues. 95
neous ownership requirement standing for holders of equity securities at any time before an
alleged wrong has been "publicly disclosed" or "known by the holder." Id. § 7.02(a)(1).
88. Id. at 89.
89. Id. § 7.08 ("authority to dismiss" if the litigation committee has followed procedures
specified in § 7.10).
90. Id. § 7.08(b).
91. Id. at 88. In the status of intervenor, plaintiff's attorney would be a watchdog over
the corporation's prosecution of the action.
92. Id. § 7.13(a).
93. See id. at 103 ("[D]isagreement will persist about whether a 'structural bias' affects
litigation committee decisions.") Cf. id.at 102 ("[N]ot one committee, in all these instances,
has decided to proceed with suit," quoting the North Carolina Court of Appeals in Alford v.
Shaw, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886 (1985), which concluded that "[tihis strongly suggests that the
problem of structural bias is indeed real.") See also Weiss, Economic Analysis, Corporate Law,
and the ALI Corporate Governance Project, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (1984) (ALl must
"recommend more radical, nonincremental changes to the present system").
94. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
95. Cf. ALl Proposals, supra note 2, at 103 ("the public impression created by such a
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In fact, the ALI draft declines to follow the one guideline courts have
evolved for dealing with the structural bias problem. Even when a majority
of directors face colorable claims against them, under the ALI proposal the
board of directors will retain power to delegate the decision whether to
pursue the claims to a special litigation committee.9 6 The ALI version directs
courts only "to consider any relevant evidence relating to the committee's
selection." 97 Because the problem of structural bias is so ubiquitous, or
because popular perceptions are that it is so, the special litigation committee
device needs some bright line protections against structural bias. Courts in
Iowa and North Carolina have developed rules which could serve as examples.
When a plaintiff has colorable claims against a majority of directors, those
courts have held boards to be without power to delegate to a litigation
committee. 9 Along these lines, an ALI draft could advise that the corporation
must consult plaintiff's counsel in the process of selecting litigation committee
members. The terms of directors added to the board solely to serve on the
committee could be limited to the next scheduled election of directors, or in
some other way. Other fixed rules to deal with the structural bias problem
are possible. 99
2. An Excess of Backup or Redundant Systems
The second area of criticism is that the ALI draft has evolved a complex
procedural pipeline whose seeming goal is to facilitate intra-corporate treat-
ment of nearly every conceivable case. As a result few if any cases can ever
get out into full light of day.
Under the ALI draft demand will be excused only when "a majority of
the board has benefited from, or knowingly participated in, the alleged
wrong, or is otherwise clearly biased.' '° An avowed aim is to make the
"futility exception ... a narrow one,"'' despite the structural bias problem
and the empirical observation that demand required usually constitutes "a
death sentence" for the derivative action. 0 2
non-adversarial [litigation committee] process is unsettling and might erode public investor
confidence in our system of corporate governance.").
96. See id. at 88-89, 117-18 and 158.
97. Id. at 137.
98. Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 715-16 (Iowa 1983);
Alford v. Shaw, 72 N.C. App. 537, 324 S.E.2d 878, 886 (1985). See also Clark v. Lomas &
Nettleton Fin. Corp., 625 F.2d 49, 53-54, (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1029 (1981).
99. See Cox, supra note 12, at 1007-11; Dent, supra note 57, at 122-27. See also Gevurtz,
Who Represents the Corporation? In Search of a Better Method For Determining The Corporate
Interest in Derivative Suits, 46 U. PrTr. L. REV. 265, 325-33 (1985) (automatic appointment of
provisional directors as the litigation committee in every instance of suit).
100. ALl Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.03(b).
I01. Id. at 54.
102. Cox, supra note 12, at 997. That requiring demand amounts to a death sentence for
the derivative action is especially true under the illogical Delaware approach, in which a court
has no authority to review the merits of a decision to terminate in demand required, as opposed
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As has been seen, 03 at the litigation committee stage there are no per se
or bright line rules dealing with structural bias. If structural, or palpable,
bias seems to be a problem anyway, as a backup device and under a liberal
waste standard shareholders can terminate the derivative action.' °4 Alterna-
tively, as another backup device, a court can appoint a "panel in lieu of a
committee of directors" or "individuals who are not directors" to fulfill the
litigation committee role.'05 In the complex ALI pipeline there are so many
alternative and cumulative filters that very few, if any cases, will see light of
day.106
The ALI draft intends that a corporation should never be paralyzed,
unable to dispose of a derivative suit at the corporate level. The opportunity
should exist for the genuine grievance actually to be tried. Plaintiffs should
be able to paralyze corporations from time to time if the benefit is that
meritorious actions will see the light of day. The prospect that a shareholder
might be able to pursue a claim would remove an otherwise inordinate
chilling effect on suits being brought in the first place.
The complex ALI procedural machine also carries a political analogy
too far. At times, a majority, or even a super majority of directors, or even
shareholders, should not be able to carry the day. 0 7 Even a purely political
institution should not be tantamount to a spoils system. In some cases a
shareholder who stands on principle should be able to remove his dispute to
the neutral outside arbiter, the judge. Alternatively, a plaintiff shareholder
should be able to do so when one or perhaps two, but not five or six, intra-
corporate obstacles have been surmounted.
to demand refused cases. See, e.g., ALI Proposals, supra note 2, at 54-55; Coffee, supra note
85, at 826 n.96-97; supra note 60.
103. See supra notes 93-99 & accompanying text.
104. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.09. The waste standard is that "a transfer for no
consideration amounts to gift or waste of corporate assets." Alternatively, "[t]he essence of a
claim ... is the diversion of corporate assets for improper or unnecessary purposes." Michelson
v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 217 (Del. 1979), cited in ALI Proposals at 130.
105. ALl Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.12. See also Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate,
Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa 1983) ("Under Iowa law, equity has broad powers to make
appointments to enable corporate functions to be carried out.").
106. Of course very few derivative actions reach trial anyway. See Coffee, supra note 85,
at 796. A principal reason is that if defendants go to trial, rather than settle, an adverse
adjudication will typically deprive them of eligibility for indemnification. Id. Yet there does
exsit a penumbra, if not light of day, between intracorporate resolution and trial.
107. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.08(d) (even though costs outweigh benefits court
can refuse board recommendation if "dismissal ... would ... frustrate any legal rule that
operates for the protection of shareholders."). See also id. § 7.09(d) (same limitation on
shareholder power to terminate). These narrow, and cryptic, limitations on board or shareholder
power recognize that principle should at times surmount majority rule. They replaced less
cryptic language in an earlier draft: "dismissal ... would not frustrate any authoriatively
established public policy." PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 7.08(a)(3) (Tent. Draft
No. 3 1983). Commentators criticized the earlier language as too broad. Compare Cox, supra
note 45, at 781-83 with Coffee, supra note 85, at 815-17. Perhaps a hybrid of the two would
work: "dismissal ... would not frustrate any legal rule or authoritatively established public
policy that operates for the protection of shareholders."
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3. The Nominal and Professional Plaintiff Problem
The ALI draft eliminates one set of overly broad and often unnecessary
barriers. But in eliminating those historical relics the draft substitutes a
complex procedural structure that will have a new and different, but still
broad, chilling effect on all potential derivative claims, good or bad. Instead,
the real derivative action problem seems to be how to police the "bad"
action, that with the abusive plaintiff and bounty hunter lawyer, while
permitting the "good" action, that with the genuinely aggrieved shareholder,
to go forward on a relatively unfettered basis. 08 It is the professional plaintiff
and his counsel who cause most of the problems with the derivative action
and which corporate counsel and commentators decry.'0 9 It is professional
plaintiffs' actions which lead to the need for reform in the first place.
In derivative actions involving Fortune 500 or New York Stock Exchange
listed companies, typically the lawyer, not the client, is at risk. The client
owns but a few shares. Ethical proscriptions to the contrary, the lawyer will
have staked the costs of the litigation." 0 The lawyer will have expended
hours of time without a steady inflow of fees out of which to pay overhead
and other expenses."' A result is that the Philadelphia or Wilmington
derivative action lawyer is more risk averse than he would have been had
the client advanced some costs and fees. Because the client has so little
invested, in either an emotional or monetary sense, the lawyer is free of any
client control over the lawyer's actions. The result is early, and inadequate,
108. Colloquially, the question is how to slow a Harry Lewis without also unduly affecting
the genuinely aggrieved shareholder. Mr. Lewis has been the named plaintiff in "several
hundred" filed, and at least 52 reported, corporation-securities law federal cases. Defendants'
Memorandum In Support of Motion For Order Staying Discovery (Dec. 9, 1982) at 6 and
Exhibit A, Lewis v. Berry, No. C82-1244 VR, W.D. Wash. at Seattle (Lexis search of federal
cases only). Mr. Lewis owns a few shares in a great number of New York Stock Exchange
listed companies. See, e.g., Affidavit of Harry Lewis (Jan. 17, 1983) at 3, Lewis v. Berry, supra
(purchase of 25 shares of Seafirst Corp.). Those few shares in myriad companies give Mr. Lewis
standing to act as plaintiff for lawyers bringing numerous lawsuits. When pressed under oath
Mr. Lewis deposes that in each of his suits he stands ready to pay all costs, as Disciplinary
Rule 5-103(B) of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility require him and not his lawyer
ultimately to do:
[I] confirm that I am ultimately responsible for the payment of a costs of this action.
I am aware that these costs may be substantial and involve and include such items as
the cost of notifying members of the class ... deposition transcripts, experts,
reproduction of documents, filing and service fees, travel, and other litigation
expenses .... I am ready, willing and able to pay these costs in the event that the
action is unsuccessful.
Affidavit of Harry Lewis, supra at 4; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-
103(B) (1981). The affidavit is silent as to the amount of costs Mr. Lewis actually has paid in
the hundreds of cases in which he has been plaintiff.
109. See, e.g., Duesenberg, supra note 5, at 332-33.
110. Cf. Affidavit of Harry Lewis, supra note 108.
111. Unlike the Portland firm, which probably has a diversified practice, in the plaintiffs'
bar derivative action firm at best the cash flow will be lumpy and the pressure to smooth out
the flow of fees will be constant.
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often cosmetic, settlements of derivative suits in which the lawyer's fee and
cash flow are the first considerations." 2
It is the naked "self interest" of the lawyer which controls when the
plaintiff has only a nominal holding."' Worse than risk averse, the lawyer
becomes fair game for a bribe, or is not checked or reined in from
extortionate activity. The derivative action is settled for generous fees paid
by the corporation. Very little deterrent or compensatory effect results.
Another incentive for the quick settlement is the free rider problem.
Since the first plaintiff's lawyer lacks any property right in the suit, other
lawyers can and will intervene." 4 They will then joust for position as lead
counsel. Backroom negotiations resembling Chicago wardheelers' meetings
take place between lawyers regarding allocation of work and fees. By
contrast, an early settlement will cut off intervenors and the need to share
fees. Yet those late arrivals and free riders must have clients. In all likelihood
those clients will be professional plaintiffs and shareholders with nominal
holdings."' Restrictions on nominal plaintiffs may ameliorate the free rider
problem and thereby lessen the compulsion to settle early and in an abusive
manner.
Last of all, "[t]he attorney without a'true' client lacks the initial source
of information that the attorney has in other forms of litigation-the data
that his client provides him.""16 Thus, the efforts of the Philadelphia-
Wilmington plaintiffs' bar focus upon Fortune 500 companies whose affairs
are regularly reported by the media." 7 Alternatively, derivative litigation is
parasitic, following in the wake of federal or state agency investigations, and
resembles an attack by a wolf pack, with many members of the plaintiffs'
bar baying at a single door." 8 Private enforcement is overly concentrated on
a few targets and produces unseemly appearances.
The answer to much of what ails the derivative action seems to be to
reduce drastically the field of play for the professional plaintiff. That end
might be accomplished by adoption of minimum ownership requirements for
derivative action plaintiffs, at least in publicly held firms. Coupled with
other reforms, such a requirement might best serve to refocus the derivative
action away from Philadelphia and Wilmington into a sphere where it is
more likely to play a useful role.
112. Coffee, supra note 5, at 229-35. Much of the following identification of problems
caused by the presence of nominal shareholders as plaintiffs comes from Professor Coffee's
work.
113. Id. at 232.
114. Id. at 233.
115. Cf. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, at 83 (normally derivative action will not involve as
many lawyers and plantiffs as securities or antitrust class actions).
116. Coffee, supra note 5, at 234.
117. See Jones, An Empirical Examination of the Incidence of Shareholder Derivative and
Class Action Lawsuits, 1971-78, 60 B. U. L. REV. 306, 315 & Table IV (1980) ("[s]ize related
differentials in the incidence of shareholder suits ... are quite pronounced"); id. at 317 n.26
(correlation of suits filed and listings in Wall Street index).
118. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 222-24.
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Restricting nominal shareholders from becoming plaintiffs does impose
costs. In American capitalism an egalitarian ideal has long prevailed, epito-
mized by "shirt sleeve" capitalism and "Own Your Own Share of American
Business" campaigns in the 1950s.119 The ideal would be eroded by minimum
ownership requirements for derivative action plaintiffs. Yet the egalitarian
ideal has already been eroded. Many stock brokerage firms no longer do
business with the small and odd lot shareholder.2 0 The SEC now imposes
minimum ownership requirements upon those who submit proxy proposals
for inclusion in managements' proxy solicitations.'2 ' The ALI has raised the
possibility that parties to a derivative action settlement need not give notice
to holders of small numbers of shares. 122 While abandonment of the egali-
tarian ideal is not without costs, the real question is whether the benefits of
maintaining that eroded ideal outweigh the cost of nominal plaintiffs'
continued abuse of the derivative action.
A second cost in reducing the field of play for the nominal or professional
plaintiff is that the reform could provide merely an additional procedural
escape for defense attorneys. Emphatically, any such reform must be a
substitute for the procedural impediments which now lie in the derivative
action's path. Moreover, the reform must take shape as a bright line rule.
Any subjective restriction on shareholders' eligibility as plaintiffs would
become a mechanism with which defense attorneys would shamelessly ques-
tion every plaintiff's bona fides. Indeed, that is already too much the strategy
of the defense bar.
A last cost that might be feared in eliminating nominal, and therefore
many professional, plaintiffs is the resulting loss of the deterrent effect on
corporations. In fact, elimination of the nominal plaintiff might improve
matters for shareholders generally. Professional plaintiffs do real plaintiffs
and shareholders few favors. Just as "hard cases make bad law," bad
plaintiffs seem to have made hard law. Subliminally or otherwise, judges
react adversely to professional plaintiffs' presence and to the strategems of
the lawyers who represent them. 23 From the truly aggrieved plaintiff's point
of view, many of the harshest precedents seem to have come down in cases
119. See Branson, Securities Regulation After Entering the Competitive Era: The Securities
Industry, SEC Policy, and the Individual Investor, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 860-61 (1980).
120. See id. at 895-96.
121. SEC Rule 14a-8(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(a) (1984) (minimum ownership requirement
is 1% or $1,000 in market value of securities to be voted at the shareholders' meeting).
122. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, at 174. Also, security for expense provisions have
applied only to plaintiffs whose shares have a market value below $25,000. See MBCA, supra
note 30, § 49; supra note 31. Cf. Marshall v. Spang & Co., 321 F. Supp. 1310, 1312 (W.D.
Pa. 1971) (other than for purposes of security for expenses, size of plaintiff's investment held
irrelevant in derivative litigation). See also Sanderson v. Winner, 507 F.2d 477, 480 (10th Cir.
1974) (as a general rule courts do not review litigants' financial status or their ability to pay
costs), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 914 (1975).
123. See Alleghany Corp. v. Kirby, 333 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1984) (Friendly, J., dissenting);
Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 782-83 (3rd Cir.) (review of district judge's open, visceral hostility
to professional plaintiff and his attorney), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
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in which a professional plaintiff sought to feather a plaintiffs' lawyer's
nest.1
24
It has been the professional plaintiff, and counsel who regularly represent
him, 125 who have given the derivative suit a bad name. Through minimum
ownership requirements or by means of other reforms, 26 restriction of the
field of play for professional plaintiffs, and not the weighing down of all
shareholders equally, is the tack the ALI must pursue.
4. Complementary Restructuring
The ALI might accomplish the goal of more selective deterrence by
taking a radically different approach consisting of several steps. As noted
above, the principal step is the elimination of the professional or nominal
shareholder as plaintiff. Insofar as the derivative action problem is a lawyers'
problem, another step might lie in the direction of curbs on lawyers and not
upon litigants generally. Next, the ALI should reverse its current position
124. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984); supra notes 23-25 & accom-
panying text (discussing Aronson). See also Lewis v. Transamerica Mortgage Investors, Inc.,
444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979) (denial of private right of action under Investment Advisers Act of
1940); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1979) (9th Circuit's adoption of
Auerbach v. Bennett rule), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Lewis v. Oppenheimer & Co.,
481 F. Supp. 1199 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (dismissal of proxy rule and state law claims); Lewis v.
Teleprompter Corp., 88 F.R.D. 11, 14-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (fee splitting and other practices of
plaintiffs' law firms discussed).
125. See Coffee, supra note 5, at 262. At least part of the derivative action problem seems
to be lawyers' lack of ethics and professionalism in certain segments of the bar or in a few
cities, claims that it is just a few "bad apples" to the contrary. Id. And, if in policing the bar
courts are a "week reed upon which to rely," id. at 236, in some manner courts and bar
associations must be made squarely to face those aspects of the problem which are lawyers'
problems. To weigh down litigants everywhere in order to police lawyers in a few locations is
manifestly unfair. Courts should enforce at least those ethical proscriptions worth enforcing.
Cf. id. at 280 (ability to split fees would allow plaintiffs' lawyers to diversify and thereby be
more efficient; diversified law firms are permitted to split fees among partners not even remotely
connected with cases). But see Coffee, supra note 84 at 812 (proposed Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 68 and fee shifting Rule 68 contemplated would not work in derivative action area);
Coffee, supra note 5, at 236 (courts have a number of opportunities at which to make lawyers
toe the line but do not as a rule use those opportunities). Cf. Lewis v. Teleprompter Corp., 88
F.R.D. 11, 22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (reduction of fees for "tag along" lawyers and other
sanctions).
126. The professional plaintiff could also be policed by enforcement of the requirement
that the derivative action plaintiff be "able to represent fairly and adequately the interests of
the shareholders in the corporation." ALI Proposals, supra note 2, at § 7.02(a)(4); FED. R.
Civ. P. 23.1. Courts, however, have used the provision as grounds for evaluating plaintiff's
counsel rather than for scrutininzing the professional plaintiff himself. See, e.g., Lewis v.
Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788-89 (3d Cir.) (plaintiff's small investment is "irrelevant" and his
"complete ignorance of facts concerning the transaction" does not make him an inadqeuate
representative), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). Moreover, courts have refused even to compel
discovery of a professional plaintiff's other corporate-securities law cases, his record in settling
those cases, his financial arrangements with his attorney, or his litigious motives in purchasing
small amounts of stock in many companies. See, e.g., Lewis v. Black, 74 F.R.D. 1, 3 (E.D.
N.Y. 1975).
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and liberally excuse demand,. 27 principally because of the structural bias
problem. Moreover, bright line rules regarding structural bias should be
allowed on occasion to shoulder aside the special litigation committee or,
indeed, any of the backup devices the ALI Proposals contemplate for the
litigation committee.128 The undoubtedly pervasive existence of structural
bias and the responsive dischord it strikes in any neutral observer informed
of how the litigation committee device operates militate in that direction.
Moreover, the ALI probably should eliminate the alternatives to the
litigation committee altogether. Demand, with demand liberally excused, and
the litigation committee, with judicial discretion and bright line rules to
guard against structural bias, should make up the entire procedural scheme. 29
The gauntlet should be compact and clearly demarcated. The restructuring
would result in greater potential for extra-corporate resolution of derivative
actions. Advocacy of that result stems from a conviction that a salutary
effect might be achieved if a few cases involving real plaintiffs in Portland,
Oregon, Portland, Maine, or elsewhere, actually went to trial.
ALI PRoPosAs: A FEw FnE TUNING IDEAS
Regardless of whether any radical restructuring takes place, a few other
changes to the ALI Proposals are in order. With regard to procedural matters
affecting the corporation in a derivative action, such as "consolidation and
appointment of lead counsel," the draft proposes "no'black letter' provision
with respect to these topics because it is assumed that prevailing law permits
the corporation ... to move for consolidation of multiple actions . .. -130
With regard to procedural burdens for plaintiffs, however, the draft is not
content with reliance on prevailing law. Instead the draft reiterates common
provisions of codes of civil procedure. The result is that the draft weighs
down plaintiffs alone with extra baggage and does so unnecessarily.
It goes with saying that in a lawsuit plaintiffs have the burden of
proof.'"' It goes without saying that by his signature on a pleading an
127. The ALI proposal to make demand universal really is an effort to reduce demand's
importance. Under the ALI schematic the demand refused case is subject to the same scrutiny
as the demand excused case. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, at 54. Under current Delaware law
no judicial review takes place to the board of directors' refusals in demand refused cases while
in demand excused cases a court can review the merits of the litigation committee's later
decision. See supra note 60. Thus demand required or demand excused has an importance out
of proportion to its proper role.
Because in the past demand has lead so frequently to adverse results, however, ex ante
any demand requirement nonetheless has a disproportionate chilling effect on plaintiffs and
their counsel. Demand, therefore, should be liberally excused, or eliminated altogether. See
Gevurtz, supra note 98, at 332 (demand should be "abolished as an unnecessary source of
confusion").
128. See supra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
129. That is, ALI Proposals §§ 7.09 & 7.12 should be deleted. See ALl Proposals, supra
note 2, §§ 7.09 & 7.12.
130. Id. at 80, relying on MANuAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (4th ed. 1977).
131. But see PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS §
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attorney certifies the pleading's good faith and adequate grounding in fact. 3 2
Routinely, codes of civil procedure provide that allegations of fraud and the
like be pleaded "with particularity." '1 To remain within even the parameters
it sets for itself, such as "striking a proper balance" between plaintiffs and
defendant corporate officials,3 4 the ALI draft should expunge all black letter
references to matters applicable to law suits and plaintiffs generally and with
which codes of civil procedure already deal on an adequate basis.
The ALI Proposals contain a number of filtering and backup filtering
mechanisms funneling toward intra-corporate resolution of derivative action
disputes.' Boards of directors, committees of boards of directors, share-
holders, judicially appointed special committee members, or judicially ap-
pointed panels in lieu of committees of directors can act. In addition the
draft presents those various organs with a smorgasboard of possible actions
to take, either simultaneously or in series. Committee members can choose
from a panoply of choices the draft sets out, ranging from "seek[ing]
dismissal [for] . . . failure to exhaust intra-corporate remedies," "seek[ing]
a stay of the action" or a stay of discovery, possibly pending an intra
corporate investigation, investigating internally, or adopting or pursuing "the
action in its [the corporation's] own right."' 13 6 Courts have already found
the less clearly contoured common law litigation committee device a source
of excessive delay and cost. 1 With the well mapped route to delay that the
ALI Proposals may represent, and the superior resources and large law firms
that corporations are able to command, corporations will use the ALI's
proliferation of choices to wage wasteful wars of attrition with plaintiffs.
The ALI might therefore consider black letter time limitations, or guidelines
in the comments, for the exercise of some or all of these corporate choices. 38
4.01(d) (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1985) (approved by the Institute May 15, 1985 for ultimate inclusion
in Part VII, Chapter 1, at § 7.16).
132. Compare ALl Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.04(a) with FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 11.
133. Compare ALl Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.04(b) with FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 9(b).
134. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, at 3.
135. See supra notes 103-06 & accompanying text.
136. ALI Proposals, supra note 2, § 7.06(a).
137. See Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 511-12 (Del. Ch. 1984), aff'd, 17 SEc. REo. &
L. REP. (BNA) at 1888 (Oct. 9, 1985). In Kaplan, Chancellor Brown stated:
[T]he new Zapata procedure ... has the pragmatic effect of setting up a form of
litigation within litigation. (At this point in this case, we are some three years after
the amended complaint was filed, we have had three full-scale, briefed arguments,
we have had all the investigation and activity previously mentioned, and as yet we
have not reached the point of any normal discovery and motion practice... ). The
Zapata procedure adds, in effect, a new party to derivative litigation-the Special
Litigation Committee-and a new battery of lawyers-counsel for the committee ....
It sidetracks derivative litigation as we have heretofore known it for approximately
two years at a minimum while the committee goes through its functions and while
the plaintiff passively awaits ....
484 A.2d at 511-12.
138. Other possibilities for clarification of ALI Proposals also exist. See supra note 106
(suggesting language limiting board and shareholder power).
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TiH GENUINELY AGGRIEVED SHAREHOLDER:
DoEs HE OR SHE EXIST?
This article supposes the existence of a derivative action plaintiff denom-
inated the "genuinely aggrieved shareholder," defined as a "shareholder
whose stake in the corporation, while not alone large enough to justify the
costs of litigation, is much greater than nominal."' 3 9 Moreover, that plaintiff
has as counsel a lawyer whose practice does not consist solely, or even
primarily, of derivative suit litigation. On those factual assumptions, this
article then proposes a restructuring of the ALI derivative action provisions.
Three questions are in order. First, does the genuinely aggrieved share-
holder exist in numbers sufficient to justify change to the ALI proposal?
Some observers infer that he does not. 40 Second, if the genuinely aggrieved
shareholder in Portland, Oregon or Portland, Maine does exist, is he
adequately represented? The Wilmington, Philadelphia, and other plaintiffs'
bars may cover the waterfront sufficiently. Alternatively, between local
counsel and occasional forays into the "hinterlands" by members of the
plaintiffs' bar, adequate representation results. No change is necessary.
Third, if the genuinely aggrieved shareholder does exist, and if he or she is
consistently under-represented, why are these would-be plaintiffs under-
represented? Without empirical research, no certain answers are possible.
Nonetheless, some reasoned speculation can go forward.
From time to time, the genuinely aggrieved shareholder does surface in
reported cases.' 4' Most opinions, however, neither report on nor inquire into
the extent of plaintiffs' interest or ownership, in large part because existing
law deems it irrelevant.
42
One line of thought considers that the genuinely aggrieved shareholder
does not exist in any number because shareholders in companies below the
Fortune 500 level simply do not find out about possible wrongdoing. The
Wall Street Journal and other business media do not follow, investigate, or
report on the affairs of over-the-counter (OTC) or American Stock Exchange
companies, or do not do so in depth. 4 This view, however, is extremely
139. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
140. See Coffee, supra note 84, at 800:
[Tlhe derivative action has essentially functioned as a monitoring mechanism chiefly
with respect to publicly traded corporations. This is probably because the engine that
drives the derivative action-the professional plaintiff's attorney-is only in a position
to monitor the behavior of those corporations subject to federal disclosure standards.
The underground railroad that somehow connects these attorneys with eligible share-
holders seldom runs to smaller corporations .... (footnotes omitted).
Cf. Cox, supra note 45, at 761. For the most past, Professor Coffee means large publicly held
companies for the Fortune 500 or NYSE listed variety and the underground railroad running
to professional and other nominal plaintiffs.
141. See, e.g., Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, 368 (1965) (named plaintiff
and invested $2,000 in 1957 while her son-in-law had purchased $45,000 in stock and $10,000
in bonds).
142. See supra note 122.
143. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 235; Coffee, supra note 84 at 800-01; Jones, supra
note 117, at 317 n.26.
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provincial. Regional media often report on imbroglios and failures of local
and regionally held public, and even quasi-public, companies with a zest and
taste for scandal that surpasses anything in the Wall Street Journal.,44 The
shareholder in those local and regional companies is more likely to discover
and be angered by corporate developments 145 than is the professional plain-
tiff, who discovers through and then has to be recruited by the professional
plaintiffs' lawyer.
A possible reason why the genuinely aggrieved shareholder is not more
visible is that some shareholder litigation in local and regional companies
may go forward under other guises. It is still possible to dress some
mismanagement claims in federal securities law wraps. 46 Some cases might
be brought and settled as state securities law claims, where standing is
broader than under federal law and attorney's fees are provided the successful
plaintiff by statute. 47 Still other claims could be brought under the banner
of denial of rights associated with shareholding, in which case a representative
rather than derivative suit will lie. 48 That significant numbers of aggrieved
shareholders are hidden in those disguises, though, is unlikely. The volume
of all such litigation is not great, nor does the volume seem to have increased
since the advent of the special litigation committee or other developments
inimical to derivative actions. A number but certainly not a flood of cases
are probably so disguised.
It is possible, though, to identify categories of shareholders whose stake
is more than nominal and for whom the sale of shares is not an adequate
response to wrongdoing. Very recently much attention has focused on those
categories, labeled generically as inframarginal shareholders. 49 Inframarginal
shareholders have become increasingly aggrieved and militant in at least two
types of situations, change of control transactions and business failures and
workouts. 50 These shareholders, for example, may be long term employees
who have relatively non-diversified portfolios with substantial, but less than
144. On the other hand, in some regional centers media may be imbued with an uncritical
boosterism which resembles that prevalent in Sinclair Lewis' mythical town of Zenith. See S.
LEwis, BABBrr at 134 (1922) (Signet Classics ed. 1961).
145. See infra notes 149-50 and accompanying text. Geographical proximity or employment,
or both, may heighten a shareholder's identification with a company and, indeed, lead to
characterization of that shareholder as inframarginal. Id.
146. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977) (federal securities law
claim for failure to disclose facts giving rise to state law fiduciary duty or other claim), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
147. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
148. See ALI Proposals, supra note 2, at 26-27; W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 12,
at 896-99.
149. See Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. Rav. 645,
652-56 (1984). In more technical terms, the inframarginal shareholder is one who will not offer
his shares at the equilibrium price. The price at which the market, or submarket, for his shares
will clear is above and to the left of the cartesian coordinates indicating equilibrium price for
the market as a whole. See generally A. ALCHiAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION
239-56 (3d ed. 1983).
150. See, e.g., Cohn, Eastern Airlines Union Leaders are Taking Steps Toward Possible
Bid for Control, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1986, at 5, col. 1-4; Long, Danville Va., Joins Dan River's
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controlling, interests in the employer corporation. Members of the commu-
nity where the corporation has headquarters or significant facilities may own
more than nominal amounts of stock and perceive that they have enough at
stake to voice a grievance against management. Long term investors and
owners of shares in so-called opportunity companies'"' are other inframar-
ginal shareholders who have a stake, or perceive themselves as having a
stake, larger than just the dollars invested. While the legitimacy of many
inframarginal shareholders' activities is undoubtedly subject to debate, infra-
marginal shareholders increasingly have come to the fore and support the
plausibility of the genuinely aggrieved shareholder scenario.
Another source of aggrieved shareholders can be a group of shareholders,
inframarginal or otherwise, who band together to affect corporate conduct,
possibly by litigation. 52 The author of this article has participated in two
such cases, both involving regional OTC companies. In one case, approxi-
mately 45 of 2,000 shareholders, holding 14-15 percent of the shares, joined
as named plaintiffs, or supported the litigation by contributions for costs
and fees. 5 3 In another example, 20 or so shareholders, owning approximately
550,000 of 5.8 million shares, met to consider combined securities and
fiduciary duty claims against management of a prominent regional financial
institution. Prospective group members were all "mere" investors.
Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence indicates only the plausibility of the
truly aggrieved shareholder scenario. It does not establish the frequency or
reality of the phenomenon. Assuming, however, a not insignificant frequency
of possible wrongdoing and resulting shareholder grievances in local and
regional companies, the next question is why the rate of litigation does not
approach that in larger companies. 5 4 Consistent underrepresentation, rather
than a lack of suspected wrongdoing, or a lack of genuinely aggrieved
shareholders because of shareholder ignorance or apathy, may be the answer.
The plaintiffs' bar does not exist beyond a handful of cities. Unless the
stakes are very large, established plaintiffs' firms do not wish to litigate in
distant locales. Changes in time zones and travel time can make a single
Battle Against Icahn's Offer, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1982, at 19, col. 2. Dan River, Inc.,
shareholder employees and shareholder residents of the company's headquarters town were
active in the corporation's defense against Carl Icahn's takeover efforts, as were Phillips
Petroleum shareholder employees in the Mesa Petroleum Co. bid for Phillips' shares, and
Eastern Airlines shareholder employees in Eastern's acquisition by Texas Air Corp. Cohn,
supra; Long, supra.
151. "Opportunity companies" are those companies whose present assets and earnings
may be insubstantial but whose long term growth prospects are perceived to be the reverse,
such as so-called high tech companies.
152. See generally Branson, Organizing the Inframarginal Shareholder: Shareholder Op-
position To, Or Shareholder Participation in Management Opposition To, A Tender Offer, L.
Rev. (forthcoming) (1986) (copy on file with Washington & Lee Law Review).
153. Peterson v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc., No. C 79-914 M (W.D. Wash., complaint filed
Aug. 3, 1979).
154. See Jones, supra note 117, at 316 (3.6 year frequency of suit for largest 80 of Fortune
500 compared to 17.6 year frequency for random 110 from Fortune 1000 largest firms).
[Vol. 43:399
ALl PRINCIPALS OF GOVERNANCE
deposition or motion in Portland, Oregon or Portland, Maine into a two or
three day proposition. With the number of cases in Fortune 500 or similar
companies required for adequate diversification and cash flow, plaintiffs'
firms cannot afford the time necessary to litigate in distant places. Only
infrequently will established plaintiffs' firms venture far afield, when the
perceived chance of success is high and a large publicly held company is
involved."'
Consequently, aggrieved shareholders in local and regional public com-
panies, of which there are very many, 5 6 may be consistently underrepre-
sented. Contrary to assertions that the derivative action results in excessive
and perverse incentives for lawyers,'5 7 on the regional level a marked lack of
incentive for counsel exists. The derivative action has a bad name. 5 It is
procedurally complex. Procedural impediments impose an untold chilling
effect on counsel. 59 The special litigation committee has chilled counsel still
more. The defending law firm is likely to have vastly superior resources. The
plaintiff's side of the litigation will be consistently underfunded, at least
until the plaintiff gains some measure of success and the attorney obtains
fees in settlement or otherwise. Meanwhile, overhead, including rent and
associates' salaries, must be paid. Meanwhile, too, has become a long while,
since under right to speedy trial acts criminal prosecutions take precedence
on court calendars.'16 The time frame for civil litigation has been stretched
out interminably and the law firm must be prepared to carry overhead for
that period. Quite dramatically, on local and regional levels, lawyers and
law firms qualified for prosecuting corporation law cases do not want
contingent fee business litigation anymore, regardless of the chance for
success or the ability to recover fees from the corporation's treasury. On the
regional level, meritorious cases seem to go begging for want of qualified
counsel.
The ALI should think twice about the ALI Proposals' present course .
That course would add delay and increase the chilling effect that derivative
155. Cf. Lewis v. Berry, No. C 82-1244 VR, W.D. Wash. at Seattle (suit arising from
failure of Seafirst Corp. due to extensive bank energy lending).
156. See 49 SEC ANN. REP. 99 (1984). Below the Fortune 500 level there remain 2554
other issuers with shares listed on national securities exchanges. Id. There are 3700 issuers with
shares traded OTC, quoted nationally over the National Assn. of Securities Dealers Automated
Quotation system. Id. at 93. Beneath that level there are again as many, or more, companies
with shares traded OTC, registered with and reporting to the SEC. These companies have a
class of equity securities held by 500 or more persons and $3 million or more in assets. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g), 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1981), modified by SEC Release No. 34-
18,647 (April 15, 1982). Below that level the SEC estimated that 84,000 quasi-public companies,
issuers with 10-499 shareholders exist. See Conard, supra note 9, at 458.
157. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 5, at 262.
158. Some litigators and business lawyers opine that, in regional financial centers when a
law firm takes the plaintiff's side in shareholder actions more than on an isolated occasion,
that law firm will be ostracized both by the corporate bar and by the corporate community.
159. See supra notes 12-50 and accompanying text.
160. See Project, The Speedy Trial Act: An Empirical Study, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 713,
726-34 (1979).
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action procedure has on counsel, not only at the plaintiffs' bar but on local
and regional levels as well. On those levels the disincentives involved in
derivative litigation already may be excessive.
CONCLUSION
This jeremiad's purpose has been to demonstrate that a significant other
side to the derivative action exists that the ALI and its reporter have yet
closely to examine. On this other side, conditions may be quite different,
indeed almost opposite, from those prevailing in litigation involving Fortune
500 and other large national companies. This other side may have significance
not only for individual shareholders and for lawyers not members of the
plaintiffs' bar, but also for larger corporations and their counsel, who as
investors in other companies could one day litigate a derivative action. On a
macroeconomic basis, this other side also represents a not inconsiderable
sector of the economy.
This article's conclusion is that the proper approach for the American
Law Institute is to facilitate litigation on the other side, or at least to permit
it to go forward in as unfettered a manner as possible. With all due respect
to the ALI reportorial staff, who in the corporate governance project have
done a superb job, in the derivative action area the best reform might be
one that insofar as possible only affects derivative suits that readily can be
identified as, or predicted to be, abusive. The ALI might best achieve that
result by attempting to restrain or eliminate the nominal shareholder and
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